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vJapan’s Manufacturing Competitiveness Strategy 
Because I was born in Japan to missionary parents 
and lived there until college, a goal of mine was 
to find a bridge between my past in Japan and 
my professional career at the U.S. Department 
of Commerce. I completed a temporary detail 
in the spring of 2007 to Japan that helped me to 
fulfill this goal.When I decided to do a detail to 
the U.S. Embassy in Japan, I explored possible 
areas of research in U.S.–Japan trade policy. 
After my consultations with ITA senior staff 
members, investigating Japan’s manufacturing 
competitiveness strategy seemed like a needed 
project. 
Because I had worked on the Department of 
Commerce’s recent Manufacturing Strategy 
Initiative, I was keen to learn more about Japan’s 
approach to competitiveness, especially in light 
of Japan’s emergence from a period of lengthy 
economic stagnation.1 How is Japan organizing 
itself to move to the next level of manufacturing 
technology and competitiveness to offset growth 
from China and the rest of Asia? Does the Japanese 
government have a roadmap for staying ahead of 
global competition? Does the private sector have a 
manufacturing strategy of its own?
Would I hear something different from successful 
U.S. companies in Japan? Was there a pattern to 
successful business models for foreign firms in the 
Japanese market? 
If we ask those questions to a variety of industry 
and government insiders, a clearer picture of 
Japan’s reformulated competitive strategy should 
emerge. 
This project was not intended to be a thorough 
survey of Japanese industry or government 
agencies. Within a mere four weeks, just a 
snapshot—or glimpse—of what is happening 
in the manufacturing arena emerged. Drawing 
from close to 100 pages of my handwritten notes 
taken during interviews, I have presented only 
a sampling of case studies. What is summarized 
here is based, however, on what I heard and was 
redrafted from my extensive notes. The concepts 
are not mine, but they are conveyed through the 
interviews. 
Jane Corwin 
Director, Office of Trade Policy Analysis, 
Manufacturing and Services, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.
Foreword
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After a 10-year period of economic stagnation, 
Japan is pursuing various tracks to promote the 
expansion of its economy and its manufacturing 
sector in particular. Japan is engaged in a cohesive 
“innovation program” at all levels: academia, 
government, and industry. There is a widespread 
belief in all sectors of Japan’s economy that 
innovation will be the linchpin for improving 
productivity and for sustaining strong economic 
growth and global competitiveness. Innovation is 
viewed not only as technological invention, but 
also as a broad social transformation that enables 
ideas and discoveries with the creation of new 
social systems and values. 
The Japanese government’s science and 
technology (S&T) strategic roadmap and its 
manufacturing competitiveness strategy are 
inextricably linked, well coordinated and 
organized, consistent in focus and policy direction, 
and very well funded. The overall strategy 
according to those roadmaps includes a number of 
key components: 
Maintain various research funding levels • 
according to the development stage of research 
and development (R&D).
Build a sustainable and progressive industry–• 
academia–government collaboration.
Promote the use of new technologies in the • 
public sector.
Promote entrepreneurial activities and R&D • 
ventures by private enterprises.
Japan’s promotion of an active S&T strategy 
is designed to help jump-start innovation and 
to enable success in the manufacturing sector 
and the economy as a whole. In the minds of 
Japanese leaders, another key to Japan’s global 
competitiveness will be the development 
of its human resources. Facing a declining 
workforce, an aging population, and the loss of 
its “manufacturing culture,” the government is 
moving quickly to build strong alliances with 
universities to develop intensive new curriculums 
in science and technology and to conduct joint 
research on new technologies.
Japanese industries are moving forward on an 
aggressive competitiveness strategy of their 
own—without direct government support or 
intervention. According to many influential 
business leaders, government policies are having 
less effect on private-sector innovation strategies 
than in the past. Industries are moving quickly 
to build strong alliances with universities, as 
well as to harness new technologies, to develop 
new innovations on original inventions, and to 
bring them to market quickly in order to remain 
competitive. 
Japanese academia, government officials, 
industry, and U.S. industry operating in Japan have 
highlighted various opportunities for greater U.S.–
Japan cooperation and business endeavors. Those 
opportunities represent only a small sample of the 
many areas of possible cooperation and business 
development. The examples herein are to provide 
an illustrative sampling of potential opportunities 
as seen by leaders in Japan and by multinationals 
operating in Japan. The samples do not represent 
an endorsement of a particular entity, opportunity, 
or policy recommendation. 
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Opportunities highlighted by Japanese companies, 
officials, and academies, as well as U.S. companies 
in Japan, include the following:
Early collaborations between U.S. and • 
Japanese university professors, engineers, and 
researchers can provide opportunities for U.S. 
technologies and joint ventures.
Japan’s Center of Excellence programs can be a • 
launch pad for greater U.S.–Japan involvement 
and collaboration on academic research.
Japan and the United States could collaborate • 
closely on nanotechnology, particularly in the 
area of standards development.
A new bilateral initiative focusing on innovation • 
could lead to collaborations in energy, health, 
and environment—thus exploring drivers such 
as access to venture capital, entrepreneurship, 
protection of intellectual property rights, 
commercialization of R&D and technology 
transfer.
Harmonization of regulations and standards • 
could help facilitate trade between the two 
countries and aid in the operation of U.S. 
companies in Japan.
Because there is significant consumer market • 
demand in Japan in the health-care sector, 
trained health-care professionals, services, and 
products will be needed.
U.S. software services could be pursued in the • 
Japanese market to meet the software needs of 
technology-driven companies. 
Environmental testing services could be a • 
significant growth market. The United States is 
ahead in this arena and could continue to be a 
strong leader in the Japanese market. 
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Introduction
This report contains insights from interviews with 
various Japanese academics, Japanese government 
officials, Japanese industry representatives, and 
representatives of U.S. companies operating in 
Japan. The conducted interviews are not meant to 
be an exhaustive list nor a scientific survey. Time, 
availability, and travel limitations affected which 
entities were interviewed. Meetings with various 
representatives were conducted to gain first-hand 
insight on the happenings of the manufacturing 
sector of Japan. Within just four weeks, a 
snapshot or glimpse of what is happening in the 
manufacturing arena emerged.
From nearly 100 pages of handwritten notes taken 
during interviews, this report presents only a 
sampling of case studies that represent the views of 
those interviewed. A list of interviewed entities can 
be found in Appendix B. While the interviews and 
research were conducted before the financial and 
economic crisis in fall 2008, many of the insights 
and lessons learned remain pertinent and timely. 
Japan’s efforts to enhance its competitiveness and 
to advance its economy have become even more 
relevant. 
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Five themes illustrate the current state of Japan’s efforts to enhance its competitiveness and advance its economy: 
Japan is engaged in a cohesive “innovation 1. 
program” at all levels—academia, government, 
and industry.
Japan’s science and technology and its 2. 
manufacturing competitiveness strategic 
roadmaps are inextricably linked and well funded.
Japan’s key to global competitiveness will be to 3. 
develop its human resources.
Japanese industry is moving forward with an 4. 
aggressive competitiveness strategy without direct 
government support or intervention.
Japanese leaders are thinking about how to 5. 
advance the country’s strategic and commercial 
relationship with that of the United States.
“Innovation 25” Initiative:  
Looking Ahead to 2025
The first theme is engagement by Japan in a 
cohesive program at all levels of government 
and industry to regain what momentum was 
lost during the economic downturn years.2 
This program can be summed up in one word: 
innovation. The “Innovation 25” project was 
launched in 2006 to develop a strategic policy 
roadmap for the next two decades; it is geared 
toward “maintain[ing] dynamic economic growth 
in the face of a declining population with aging 
society,3 [and] it is critical to empower Japan’s 
economy through ‘innovation’ and an ‘open’ 
attitude.”4 According to Japan’s Innovation 
25 strategy, for the country “to become a truly 
innovative society, the national policies and 
corporate strategies must be internationally 
credible, science-based, not precedent-based; 
and the assessments, reasoning, and valuation 
of public vs. private investments and cost-
effectiveness must be documented.”5 
Japan sees innovation as playing an important 
role in improving productivity, which will drive 
its economic growth and global competitiveness, 
while empowering the nation to contribute to 
world growth. This can prove especially impor-
tant given Japan’s lagging productivity figures. 
In 2005, for instance, Japan claimed the lowest 
productivity rates among industrialized nations, 
trailing the United States by nearly 70 percent.6 
These discouraging numbers are a direct reflec-
tion of Japan’s service sector, which consistently 
receives poor marks. In addition to encouraging 
innovation as a remedy for poor productivity, the 
Japanese government plans to focus on deregula-
tion to assist small businesses and to make better 
use of information technology.7 
Innovation does not mean technological 
invention and renovation only, but rather a broad 
social transformation brought through the results 
of ideas, discoveries, and invention and with 
the creation of new social systems and values.8 
Japan’s policies to achieve innovation include  
(a) using global environmental issues as an 
engine for economic growth and international 
contributions, (b) doubling investments for 
education, (c) reforming universities,  
(d) increasing investments in science and 
technology, (e) reviewing regulations and social 
systems with the aim of promoting innovation,  
and (f) establishing mechanisms within the 
government to drive Japan as an innovation-
oriented nation.
Overarching Themes
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The Innovation 25 project will guide specific 
program initiatives. In 2007, the government 
of Japan began funding and building “world 
class research institutes.” Japan’s Ministry of 
Education, Science, and Technology (MEXT) 
is supporting the “World Premier International 
Research Centers Initiative” (WPI), which aims to 
maintain five world-class research institutes with 
US$4 million to US$7 million of funding for each 
institute per year for 10–15 years. 
MEXT also initiated the 21st Century Center of 
Excellence (COE) program, creating 274 centers 
between 2002 and 2004 with funding of about 
US$1.1 million per year for five years for each 
project, totaling US$1.5 billion. The program is 
designed to “cultivate a competitive academic 
environment among Japanese universities by 
giving targeted support to the creation of world-
standard research and education bases.”9 The 
budget for 2007 was approximately US$186.6 
million for on-going grants, and the New Global 
COE program starting in 2007 had a budget of 
US$133.5 million.10 The New Global COE program 
will focus on improving human capital in a global 
context.
Strategic Roadmaps: Science, 
Technology, and Industry Linked 
Together 
The second theme is the link between the 
Japanese government’s science and technology 
(S&T) strategic roadmap and the country’s 
manufacturing competitiveness strategy. These 
two are inextricably linked, well coordinated, and 
well organized; are consistent in policy direction; 
and are very well funded. Japan has promulgated 
an S&T strategy that is a driving force throughout 
the country at all levels. Now in the third phase, 
the Science Basic Plan focuses on research and 
development (R&D) and new manufacturing 
processes. The plan is focused around eight 
priority areas: life sciences, information and 
communication technology, environmental 
sciences, nanotechnology and materials, energy, 
manufacturing technology, infrastructure, and 
frontiers (outer space and oceans). The total 
budget for R&D for 2007 was estimated to be 
US$137.9 billion (university research US$26 
billion, public research US$14.6 billion, and 
private companies US$97.3 billion).11
The United States, from business and government 
sources, spent more than US$284 billion on 
R&D for 2003. For the same year, Japanese R&D 
expenditures from both sources equaled US$114 
billion. Although the United States spent more 
than Japan in absolute value, Japan’s R&D total 
expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) at 3.2 percent was greater than 
that of the United States at 2.6 percent.12 More 
of Japan’s total expenditures were sourced 
by business enterprises (74.5 percent) than 
by the government (20 percent). Similarly, 
R&D expenditures in the United States were 
also sourced more by business enterprises (63 
percent) than by the government (31 percent).13
The overall strategy according to Japan’s basic 
plan is to maintain various research funding 
levels according to the development stage of 
R&D, to build a sustainable and progressive 
industry–academia–government collaboration, to 
promote the use of new technologies in the public 
sector, and to promote entrepreneurial activities 
and R&D ventures by private enterprises.14 
Though a significant amount of R&D is being 
invested and patents are being issued, there is 
a general belief that “when compared to [that 
of the United States], the investment of R&D 
does not always generate profits, and [when 
compared to that of] other countries, human 
interaction is not sufficient.”15 Programs such 
as the New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (NEDO), a government 
R&D funding agency, are working to forge a 
stronger link between increased spending on R&D 
and increased profits. NEDO has introduced a 
new system for companies in which they must 
demonstrate how the R&D will lead to innovations 
if they are to qualify for R&D grants.16 
The promotion and commercialization of 
R&D is recognized as the basis for improving 
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manufacturing competitiveness. According to the 
government’s most recent “Monozukuri [which 
literally means the making of things] White 
Paper,”17 innovation is cited as the cornerstone of 
economic growth, and improvements in scientific 
knowledge and technology development are seen 
as essential. In addition, Japan sees minimizing 
the effect of environmental and population 
constraints as being necessary to achieve 
manufacturing competitiveness. 
Japan hopes to increase its manufacturing 
competiveness by harnessing the investments 
in R&D through aggressive commercialization 
programs and by strengthening collaborations 
and partnerships among academia, industry, 
and government. This concept is known as the 
“Innovation Highway Concept—Public–Private 
Sector Collaboration.” Development focus areas 
include rare metal substitution, newly designed 
airplanes and rockets, next generation robots, 
nanotechnology basic research, effective Internet 
search systems, advanced medical technologies, 
and next generation fuel batteries.18 These 
focus areas and strategies are directly linked 
to the Science Basic Plan. Finally, Japan sees 
enhancing labor mobility, attracting foreign 
direct investment and talent from overseas, and 
creating new markets as key to achieving greater 
competitiveness.
Human Resources and Education: 
Investing in People
As for the third theme, Japanese government 
experts stated that the key for innovation will be 
to develop human resources and people:  
“… people who think, plan, and execute. 
[Thus,] the more international experiences and 
exchanges and the more opportunities for Japan’s 
youth, the easier and more natural it will be for 
Japan to become a truly Open Society.”19 This is 
one of the key goals of the Innovation 25 initiative. 
Japan believes that its universities must be 
reformed to become places where young 
people from various countries—with different 
backgrounds and with high aspirations—can 
share their talents. The government believes that 
achieving sustainable growth even when the 
population is declining will require improving 
levels of productivity and well-being in society 
through collaboration and cooperation with 
“non-Japanese” and “non-conventional” 
Japanese people. Japan sees creating new all-
English universities, such as the one in Okinawa, 
as fostering the kind of international collaboration 
that will be key to realizing this goal. The doctoral 
program in materials science and engineering at 
the University of Tsukuba admits approximately 
one-half of its students from abroad, and 
seminars are conducted in English. 
The National Institute for Materials Science 
initiated a bold reform by opening its doors to 
talented researchers from around the world in 
2003, and it created the International Center 
for Young Scientists (ICYS) with the support of 
MEXT. Efforts continue to expand this new ICYS 
system to other research institutes in Japan.20 
The internationalization of Japan’s universities 
and research centers is part of the government’s 
overall innovation strategy. For instance, 
Japan’s largest public R&D management 
organization for promoting the development 
of advanced industrial, environmental, and 
energy technologies is New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development Organization (NEDO). 
NEDO is working on international projects that 
range from focusing on efficient energy usage to 
engaging in international cooperative research 
programs.21 
Another force driving this trend toward a more 
English-speaking society is the competitive 
challenge of Asia. In India, China, and much 
of Asia, English is the common international 
language; therefore, Japan knows that it too must 
be able to converse in English. For the Japanese, 
language barriers must be overcome to be a 
dominant competitive player in Asia. 
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A Different Kind of Industrial Policy and 
Competitiveness Strategy Led by the 
Private Sector
The fourth theme is that, contrary to popular 
belief, Japanese industry is moving forward 
on an aggressive competitiveness strategy of 
its own, without direct government support 
or intervention. According to many influential 
business leaders, government policies are 
having less effect on private-sector innovation 
strategies than they have had in the past. 
Facing the competitive pressures from China, 
a declining workforce, an aging population, 
and a loss of “manufacturing culture” or sense 
of genba,22 industries are moving quickly to 
build strong alliances with universities to 
harness new technologies, to develop new 
innovations on original inventions, and to bring 
them to market quickly. According to a leader 
in analytical instrumentation, “[D]eveloping 
innovative technologies and working together 
with universities at the prefectural level such as 
the Ishikawa Science Park (industry–academia–
government collaboration) will be key to our 
future success.”23 
With the growing use of robots on the shop 
floor, researchers and engineers are replacing 
production line workers. According to a global 
leader in robotics, approximately 30 percent of 
Japanese employees are now engineers.24 Using 
basic research to develop new technologies, 
private companies are relied on to discover 
potential applications. With the exception of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), private 
companies are no longer getting direct supports 
from the government (Ministry of Economics, 
Trade, and Industry or MEXT) to develop 
products. It is the universities, national labs, and 
research institutes that receive support. Moreover, 
with the new Technology Licensing Organization 
(TLO) law, professors at the universities are 
able to create their own companies without 
government approval. This change is a major shift 
from the past. 
According to the various global leaders, Japan 
should strive to become a post-service economy, 
with the challenge being to shift to value creation 
and strategic sectors. These leaders believe that 
firms at the top should continue to innovate to 
maintain their competitive lead, as opposed to 
diversification. Many manufacturers are making 
strategic decisions to retain their integrated 
manufacturing processes operations in Japan, 
while shifting their modular, less high-tech 
processes to other Asian countries.25 In other 
words, manufacturing decisions are made with 
a long-term focus. This focus is, in essence, the 
concept of “localization” within the globalization 
framework.26 
Given Japan’s declining and aging population, 
firms are focusing on increasing productivity 
growth through skills upgrading—that is, human 
resource development. Japanese firms believe 
that focusing on customer needs, production 
quality, delivery systems, and the details remain 
the cornerstone of manufacturing excellence and 
competitiveness. This emphasis keeps top salaries 
manageable: the average annual salary of chief 
executive officers rarely exceeds US$1 million. 
U.S.–Japan Economic Partnership 
According to government, academic, and industry 
sources in Japan, focusing on the country’s 
relationship with the United States with regard 
to overall strategy—within both the public and 
private sectors—is of utmost importance and 
comes at a critical time, for many reasons. While 
the rest of the world seems preoccupied with 
China, India, and other emerging economic 
powers, Japan is moving steadily forward on 
all fronts to address what it sees as significant 
internal challenges in the areas of demographics, 
energy, and environment, as well as the 
competitive threat posed by China and the 
rest of Asia. Since its recovery from the 10-year 
recession, Japan’s economy has been steadily  
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growing. The country’s GDP in 2007 equaled 
US$4.38 trillion, up 2.1 percent from 2006, which 
was up 2.2 percent from 2005.27, 28 
The alliances and partnerships that were formed 
between the United States and Japan following 
World War II have matured over the past 63 years. 
As the United States embarks on implementing 
free trade agreements with numerous partners, 
Japan is also forming multiple “economic 
partnership agreements.”29 Many people in both 
countries are calling for a U.S.–Japan initiative. 
In November 2006, the U.S.–Japan Business 
Council (USJBC) issued a policy statement, which 
concluded that the most effective and lasting 
way to revitalize U.S.–Japan economic relations 
is through a comprehensive, binding economic 
partnership agreement.30 
The USJBC urged former Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe and former President George W. Bush to take 
the initiative to get this process started by agreeing 
to start exchanging information and ideas about 
the specific outlines of a comprehensive, high-
level economic partnership agreement as soon as 
possible. The leading U.S. business organization 
in Japan, the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Japan  has made this agreement a focal point 
since April 2006. Nippon Keidanren and Keizai 
Doyukai, Japan’s most influential business 
organizations, have also urged the governments 
to move forward on this issue. Nippon Keidanren 
and a major U.S. business organization, 
the Business Roundtable, also endorsed a 
comprehensive economic partnership agreement 
in a January 2007 joint statement.31 
PB  
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The following case studies further highlight the major themes identified earlier. 32 These case studies are based on first-hand 
interviews and meetings with various Japanese 
academics, government officials, and industry 
representatives. These case studies are illustra-
tive examples of the thinking of various parties 
interviewed and represent their views alone. The 
case studies are summaries of opinions and views 
expressed during interviews and are not personal 
interpretations or conjectures.
The case studies do not represent an endorsement 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce of any 
opinions or positions expressed by the parties 
interviewed. Additionally, the Department of 
Commerce does not endorse any particular 
company or industry identified in the case studies. 
Academia’s Teachings
Dr. Takahiro Fujimoto, Tokyo University33 
Dr. Takahiro Fujimoto heads an initiative that 
fuses academia with manufacturing gurus and 
engineers. This new program at Tokyo University 
(funded in part with government support) is 
attempting (a) to transfer and preserve technical 
manufacturing know-how from factory floor 
workers and managers who have recently retired 
and (b) to avoid losing their unique skills and 
knowledge.
Overview of manufacturing in Japan: According 
to Fujimoto, manufacturing in Japan began to 
change in the 1980s with a new focus on product 
development and performance integration, 
which was embodied by Toyota’s concept of 
integrated manufacturing. There were historical 
underpinnings for this kind of teamwork 
of multiskilled workers, with management 
knowledge coming out of the World War II period 
that was then focused on manufacturing. Although 
there were shortages of everything but knowledge, 
technology know-how and design were in 
abundance. 
With some of the structural problems coming 
out of the post-war period, Japan learned that, in 
the manufacturing sector, companies were more 
likely to face competition and, therefore, needed 
to constantly improve their production process to 
succeed. Fujimoto believes that those concepts 
of integration and continual improvements in 
production processes spearheaded expertise in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector, and they continue 
to be key elements of their competitiveness 
strategy today. For example, Toyota has embodied 
the idea of improving its production process 
and, therefore, places heavy importance on the 
quality of its supplier companies. Fujimoto sees 
this approach as one way by which Toyota has 
maintained competitiveness within the automotive 
field. 
Japan’s comparative advantage in today’s highly 
competitive world, according to Fujimoto, is its 
integrated product mechanisms and architectural 
designs in the manufacturing process. As its 
population declines and much cheaper wages 
can be found in continental Asia, Fujimoto 
sees Japan as having to continue to focus on 
increasing its local personnel productivity through 
advancements in the manufacturing process 
and labor force skills. He believes that the key to 
Japan’s future competitiveness will be to continue 
to outsource “modular,” or more simple products 
(e.g., refrigerators, TVs, rice cookers), and to retain 
manufacturing products requiring a sophisticated 
level of coordination, engineering design, and 
Insights from Japan:  
Case Studies—Shared Perspectives
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technology (e.g., robotics, scientific instruments, 
autos, machine tools). To him, Japan’s future 
strength is based on this fundamental principle. 
He believes that Japan should continue to 
produce where it is designing, a principle known 
as design-based production. Factories should be 
built where there is market demand, knowledge, 
information flows, synergies, and strong supplier 
relationships.
Government Perspectives
Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry 
Helping not directing the manufacturing 
industry: Today, the Ministry of Economics, 
Trade, and Industry (METI) is more market 
oriented and gives fewer directives on industrial 
policies than it did historically. Private companies 
are now developing best practices and leading 
the way on innovation and industrial policy. 
However, there are some exceptions, because 
METI and the government still create directive 
policies on manufacturing more broadly for small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Additionally, the Japanese government has 
broad manufacturing policies in place, which 
are spelled out in the annual Monozukuri 
(Manufacturing) White Paper developed jointly 
by the Labor, Science, and Industry ministries. 
One major aspect of the government’s industrial 
policy concerns the need to address human 
capital challenges that are facing the nation 
through immigration reform, innovation, and 
education. METI officials see Japan as facing 
these challenges: an aging population, a declining 
birthrate, a loss of value for monozukuri, and the 
lack of a skilled workforce. 
If Japan is to address the issues of a declining, 
aging population and a shrinking workforce, 
officials believe that Japan needs to revise its 
immigration policy. Immigration reform that 
is designed to open up the country to foreign 
workers is being stressed by businesses across 
Japan. Many consider opening doors to Malaysia 
Mexico, the Philippines, and Singapore as a 
key to Japan’s sustainable economic growth. 
The government is also helping to encourage 
innovation and new technological developments 
through support of research and development 
(R&D) projects. 
The Japanese government is also focusing on 
how to improve the skills of its workforce, in 
particular to meet the needs of the manufacturing 
industry. The government is working on investing 
in the human resource development of its 
population. To ensure that the workforce is 
adequately prepared to work in Japan’s high-
tech manufacturing sector, officials believe 
there needs to be greater collaboration between 
universities, technical schools, and industry so 
that a new curriculum can be built that will meet 
the specific needs of the manufacturing industry. 
Furthermore, universities in Japan do not attract 
foreign researchers, and this absence needs to 
change, according to METI officials interviewed. 
Global strategy: METI officials believe that 
Japan needs to continue to focus on global 
markets and a global strategy. They also believe 
that two of the key elements for a global strategy 
are (a) diversifying production locations and 
(b) negotiating free trade agreements. The 
best example of the benefits from diversifying 
production locations is in the automotive sector. 
During the 1980s, Japanese auto firms faced 
trade restrictions on automobiles and auto parts 
that were being produced in Japan and then 
exported to the United States. Because of the 
limitations on auto exports, Honda and Toyota 
started U.S.–based productions. In 2000, the 
Japanese automobile industry started production 
in China. Production is now split almost equally 
between Japan and foreign markets, with about 
10 million vehicles produced in Japan and 10 
million produced in foreign markets each year. 
This switch has helped Japan become a global 
manufacturing giant. 
A similar yet slightly different situation occurred 
in the textile industry. Japan’s strategy was to 
allow lower-skilled, lower-quality production 
to “just go to China” and to keep “higher, end 
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niche factories” in Japan. According to officials 
at METI, another major tool to promote a global 
strategy is the negotiation of trade agreements or 
economic partnership agreements. Japan has laid 
the foundation for negotiations or has completed 
agreements with Chile, Mexico, and Singapore, 
as well as the Association for Southeast Asian 
Nations.
New Energy and Industrial Technology  
Development Organization 
Changes in regulations help spur 
collaborations: In the late 1990s, the Japanese 
version of the Bayh-Dole Act  was passed, known 
as the Technology Licensing Organization 
(TLO) Act.34 The government of Japan studied 
the U.S. government’s Advanced Technology 
Program (ATP) and relevant U.S. laws.  Then it 
passed its own equivalent laws. With changes 
to the legal structure, industry and universities 
could cooperate more. Before 2003, most 
research universities were national, having been 
established by the government. The old structure 
of universities created after World  
War II limited university professors and research 
centers to collaboration with industry, and it 
prevented them from directly commercializing 
any scientific discoveries. If Japan were to 
enhance and promote industry and university 
cooperation and innovation, many believed that 
the legal structure needed to be changed. The 
TLO did just that, chiefly by allowing university 
researchers to commercialize and develop their 
scientific discoveries. Representatives of the New 
Energy and Industrial Technology Development 
Organization (NEDO) who were interviewed 
believe that greater cooperation between industry 
and universities has resulted in increased R&D on 
manufacturing-related issues. 
Government support of R&D: The government 
helps to spur research and development through 
a variety of mechanisms, including NEDO, which 
promotes R&D that individual private enterprises 
alone are incapable of implementing. Two-thirds 
of NEDO’s budget goes to research projects. 
NEDO’s participation enables widespread 
collaboration among industry, universities, and 
public research organizations, and it provides 
financial support from public funding. NEDO 
provides the seed money, organizes the projects, 
and then turns the actual research responsibilities 
over to industry and universities. 
NEDO’s goal is to improve basic research in 
special fields that industry is interested in. 
NEDO is currently supporting 18 programs 
stemming from eight priority areas (electronics 
and information technology; machinery systems 
technology; aircraft and space technology; 
nanotechnology and materials technology; 
biotechnology and medical technology; 
chemical substance management; fuel cell and 
hydrogen technologies; and new energy, energy 
conservation, and environment technologies). 
The areas of research that NEDO supports are 
often related to cutting-edge technology and 
scientific research, which are risky projects that 
industry or universities alone could not afford to 
examine. With research developments often being 
applicable to multiple fields, leaders at NEDO 
believe there is a high need for the coordination of 
all of their activities. As part of an effort to ensure 
that its funding is being used productively, NEDO 
has an evaluation (benchmarking) scheme for 
its funded projects, which is carried out by the 
Department of Evaluation. Most projects are for 
a five-year period. NEDO has a staff of more than 
1,000 to evaluate results from the collaboration 
and consortiums that it funds. 
Trade Association View
Japan Machine Tool Builders Association 
Strengths of Japan’s manufacturing sector: 
Japan Machine Tool Builders Association 
(JMTBA) representatives believe that Japan’s 
strengths in manufacturing come from a focus 
on quality and excellence in production and 
process innovation. Japanese companies may not 
invent a product; yet through innovation, they 
improve its production and quality. Innovation 
in manufacturing is being driven by companies. 
Japanese government manufacturing policies 
may not have much to do with private-sector or 
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industry innovation activities. However, while 
METI is implementing its monozukuri project, 
the Japanese are very focused on baby boomer 
retirements and the dwindling of monozukuri or 
craftsmanship, as in the culture of manufacturing.
Production process: Production process 
innovation is essential to improving 
competitiveness. The Kaizen System, an 
innovation strategy process at Toyota, was 
a private-sector initiative and has become 
the crown jewel, according to JMTBA. The 
Kaizen System is based on common strategic 
improvements. The competitiveness model is 
totally dependent on the Toyota Production 
System. According to JMTBA representatives, 
focusing on improving the production process 
and the quality of products has become a key 
feature of the Japanese manufacturing sector. If 
Japan is to improve quality in a factory, JMTBA 
leaders believe that the company must focus on 
the shop floor. Every element of the shop floor 
must be attended to: the engineering quality 
must be advanced, and there must be a high use 
of computers. Even the shop floor must be clean 
and tidy, because this cleanliness will enable 
problems to be discovered more readily. 
Successful Japanese manufacturing companies 
also stress the importance of multitasking by 
individuals and of having groups working together 
to make improvements to existing processes. To 
JMTBA, there must be an effective and immediate 
feedback system inherent in the process. 
Additionally, JMTBA representatives believe 
that the Japanese mindset is micro no gainen, or 
microscopically conceptually oriented—that is, 
conservative with great attention to detail. 
Challenges to Manufacturing Competitiveness
Government policies: Government policies—
particularly corporate law, accounting law, and 
taxation—affect corporate profitability and, 
therefore, competitiveness. For the first time in 
77 years, the government has made revisions to 
its tax policies (amortization). JMTBA representa-
tives see this move as a major step in reducing 
burdensome policies. At the same time, they 
believe that the government is still slow to make 
additional changes in those areas. 
Other countries: The association sees 
competitiveness challenges coming from foreign 
countries, where companies have begun to 
focus on producing quality products that will be 
competing against some of Japan’s top products. 
For example, Hyundai (South Korea) has been 
improving the quality of its cars and will soon be 
competing even more with Toyota. Additionally, 
other countries’ companies have realized the 
importance and success of Japanese companies’ 
processes and are examining how those processes 
can be used in their own production systems. This 
analysis is occurring particularly in India.
Lessons from Industry
Historical Perspective and Industry Overview
Consolidated from multiple interviews, many 
themes emerged regarding the history and 
perspective of Japanese companies. Many 
successful manufacturing companies in 
Japan today were originally involved in basic 
manufacturing, including textile and tatami-mat 
making machinery. Students studying in the 
universities during World War II and immediately 
after developed a tremendous amount of 
discipline, creativity, and ingenuity. 
After the war, those students and academics 
traveled the world, eager to learn and apply 
new technologies, and eventually they became 
some of the leading industrialists in Japan. After 
World War II, Japanese companies were not 
allowed to make things of a military nature. As 
a result, Japanese companies imported U.S. and 
European industrial machinery, and they were 
forced to learn how to take the machines apart 
in order to repair and retrofit them to extend 
their lifespan, their utility, or both. This process 
enabled Japanese companies to understand how 
the machines worked, and thus they learned 
how to make the machines better. In fact, many 
Japanese companies were first founded on U.S. 
or European technology. The Japanese then 
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improved the product and its production process. 
The government’s historically strong connection 
with Japanese industry enabled the collective 
strategy and policies that produced the “Japanese 
Miracle.”
Today, the Japanese government has little or 
no direct role in shaping the nation’s industrial 
sector, with the exception of SMEs. Global leaders 
in the manufacturing sector are charting their 
own course and are relying less on directions 
or funding from the government. Their success 
has come from adherence to a range of policies, 
including a continual focus on innovation. 
Manufacturing companies have worked 
to continue to innovate their products and 
production process, maximizing efficiency and 
functionality. 
Top Japanese manufacturing companies claim 
their success comes from attention to detail, 
cleanliness, quality, and customer service. 
Additionally, Japanese companies have stayed 
focused on their core products, and they do 
not often deviate or diversify into other areas 
or investment possibilities. They see this focus 
as helping them to improve and advance their 
core product lines. They see the hands-on 
management style as being another quality of 
successful manufacturing companies. Many of the 
founders of these companies have maintained an 
active role in their companies to this day, acting 
as grandfather figures. Furthermore, top-level 
managers remain connected to their employees 
through their hands-on hiring practices and 
employee programs, such as Toyota’s employee 
suggestion system. Those companies also practice 
the idea of genchi genbutsu, or go and see the real 
thing, with top managers conducting frequent site 
visits and walking around the shop floors. 
FANUC: Robotics Global Company 
The FANUC “Bible”: Dr. Eng. Seiuemon Inaba 
is the founder and current chair of FANUC. 
Originally a division within Fujitsu that was 
dedicated to computer controlled machine tools, 
FANUC broke off in 1972 to focus on several key 
areas, including robotics. The company partnered 
early on with General Electric, including a joint 
venture that lasted for more than 20 years. 
FANUC also partnered with General Motors. 
Those partnerships, along with relations with 
various European Union firms, enabled FANUC 
to stay abreast of technology developments and to 
become a global leader in industrial robotics and 
automated machine tools.
Much of Inaba’s inspiration for FANUC came 
from a Tokyo University professor who went to 
work at the University of California–Berkeley in 
1956. The professor sent Inaba and his colleagues 
at Tokyo University some research papers from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) regarding numerical controlled machine 
tools. The MIT report provided Inaba with the 
inspiration for his future work, and he refers to it 
as the “FANUC Bible.” 
Innovation is key: FANUC officials who were 
interviewed believe that R&D is central to 
its business model. One-third of all FANUC 
employees are engineers. More than 1,000 
researchers operate in 11 laboratories. With a 
pledge to stay focused on its core mission and 
not to invest in outside areas, FANUC believes 
focusing on improving its computer numerical 
control35 and robotic technology is key. According 
to company officials, innovation at FANUC has 
not been hindered by domestic regulations 
created by the government. In fact, the regulations 
have even helped to spur innovation. According 
to FANUC representatives, innovation is key to 
staying competitive and to meeting challenges 
that arise from the fast pace of changes in 
knowledge. 
Although technical information was formerly 
relevant for about 10 years, now it is relevant for 
only a short time, because technology is changing 
so quickly. Therefore, the company believes 
that training is essential. FANUC’s innovation 
depends on people who will stay “motivated” 
and on the quality of engineering. If FANUC is to 
maintain leadership, there must be consistency. 
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For staying ahead in the machine tools area, 
officials interviewed believe companies need to be 
working with machine tools for a long time—they 
need the “failure experience” to improve and stay 
competitive. 
Meeting demand: Japan’s aging population, 
declining workforce, high taxes, and high wages 
have made labor-intensive production difficult. 
FANUC officials believe that all hardware 
production should be done in Japan. Therefore, 
they are investing in basically unmanned systems 
to compete with cheap labor overseas. The robot 
cell, a huge technology-driven system, requires 
only one human operator during the workday 
and is extremely reliable. Floor managers and 
engineers can view the system from their home 
computer or even their cell phones to make 
sure operations are running smoothly. FANUC’s 
Robotic Cell Plant is producing about 2,000 
robots per month, while using only 80 workers 
on the actual manufacturing floor. The rest of the 
manufacturing is done by other robots—robots 
making robots.
Meeting global challenges: Although market 
conditions are strong, increases in crude oil 
prices and uncertainties in the Chinese economy 
will necessitate taking “precautionary actions to 
avoid any adverse trends in the business cycle. 
Under current conditions, FANUC will place even 
greater emphasis on R&D efforts. This increased 
R&D effort will be key to FANUC’s future success 
in launching highly reliable, functional, lower-
priced, and competitive products into the global 
marketplace.”36 
Toyota 
The Toyota Production System (TPS) has several 
key aspects: “just in time,” kanban (literally 
meaning a signboard or sign), multiskilled 
workers, an employee suggestion program, and 
jidoka (man and machine working together to 
ensure that no defects are passed on).
“Just in time” does not mean “just in time 
delivery” but “just in time sales.” The goal is to 
keep stock inventory as low as possible, which, 
in turn, keeps costs low. Keeping pace with sales 
means knowing what is sold, when it is sold, and 
in what amounts. Therefore, companies know 
what is needed, when it is needed, and in what 
amounts for production. The precondition for 
this just in time method of operation is having 
“leveled production.”
The kanban system is another key element of 
TPS and was first developed in 1963. Every two 
hours, the kanbans, or inventory cards that 
are located on the supplies boxes or trays at a 
point of assembly, are collected. Those cards, 
which identify specific parts, are scanned, 
and the information for the cards is directly 
communicated to suppliers so that they know 
when it is time to deliver additional parts. As a 
result, supplies are ordered as used (as needed), 
yet before they are completely depleted. The 
kanban system ensures a constant, steady flow of 
supplies, but it also ensures that there is no extra 
inventory; this approach keeps costs down and 
maintains a steady supply chain.
TPS also includes using multiskilled workers. By 
educating workers about the whole production 
process, other workers’ mistakes are quickly 
revealed, given the overlap in skill and know-how. 
To ensure that no defect is sent on to the next 
assembly station, Toyota has a “line-stop” system, 
which can be used with no penalty to a worker. In 
addition, improvements to the production system 
come directly from workers’ ideas through the 
employee suggestion system. Employees have 
suggested more than 640,000 ideas, and virtually 
all have been adopted.
Another key concept is known as jidoka, human 
productivity improvement and quality assurance. 
Jidoka is embodied in many of the other elements 
of TPS, including multiskilled workers and the 
“line-stop” system. According to Toyota officials 
questioned on the topic, Toyota faces the challenge 
of finding and developing well-trained people who 
can use the TPS system to reduce costs.
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Relationships with suppliers: Of Toyota’s 
operation, 80 percent is based on suppliers 
(about 1,000 total) located in Aichi Prefecture. 
Toyota believes that the physical location of the 
1,000 suppliers is important. The key to success 
is educating suppliers on the kanban system 
and gishiken (literally, technical expert) system. 
Toyota uses this concept of “mother plants,” which 
support a number of subplants and suppliers. 
As a result, Toyota officials interviewed believe it 
is essential to train suppliers regarding Toyota’s 
TPS concepts and its safety and quality standards. 
Ensuring the loyalty of those suppliers and their 
commitment to Toyota’s standards is critical, but it 
is also strictly voluntary. Toyota’s Supplier Support 
Center provides technical skill development to 
suppliers. One of Toyota’s overseas manufacturing 
challenges is ordering the quality and quantity of 
supplies it needs for its TPS system. 
Mazak Trading Company
Not just cheap labor: Mazak representatives 
believe that for a company to stay competitive, it 
must produce high-quality products using efficient 
production processes. It must also be continually 
focused on future innovations and developments 
in production methods. Overall, Japanese 
companies are looking to maintain a competitive 
edge, and they do not think they can do that just 
by moving to the cheapest labor supply. Much 
of manufacturing today is done with high-tech 
machinery that must be run by skilled employees. 
The key to ensuring competitiveness for Mazak is 
to focus on the productivity of workers, not just 
wages. Mazak has been able to take advantage 
of the need for high-quality supplies and parts 
for manufacturing of numerous items, which 
cannot be found from low-cost, low-skilled 
labor in places such as China. As manufacturing 
firms move to places where the high-tech parts 
cannot be made internally, Mazak supplies those 
companies with the parts for their operations. 
Mazak employees believe that if a company has 
an original technology and a competitive edge, it 
should continue to stay in Europe, Japan, or the 
United States. They believe there is no sense in 
moving to China only for cheap labor when the  
production of a product is based on the use of 
sophisticated technology, which is built from a 
high expenditure of R&D. 
Other additional problems, such as intellectual 
property right concerns, currency issues, and 
export controls, also affect a company’s decision 
not to relocate to countries with low-labor costs. 
Many products, including those produced by 
Mazak, are subject to government-imposed 
export controls for China, but not for the United 
States and Europe. If the company were to 
relocate to China or even Singapore, it would be 
required to obtain licenses. 
Ensuring productive workers: Mazak 
employees believe that in order to reduce the 
cost of manufacturing, companies must be 
more productive and must maintain a quality 
advantage. In addition to improving the 
production process through innovation, staying 
competitive means having highly productive 
workers, along with advanced technology. 
Therefore, maintaining a skilled work force is 
essential. 
Mazak officials also believe that manufacturing 
companies in Japan attract top engineers because 
of the cultural value placed on manufacturing. 
Working in manufacturing in Japan denotes the 
same social status as working in medicine or law, 
which is not always the case in the United States. 
Salary increases are not part of the philosophy that 
drives Mazak’s operation; at the same time, Mazak 
will not lay off workers. A problem will arise if a 
company focuses only on hiring qualified workers 
and does not focus on training. Mazak officials 
interviewed see companies as needing to engage 
young people and to promote the manufacturing 
sector as an employment opportunity. With 
recent fears of jobs moving to low-wage countries, 
workers themselves are intent on keeping 
manufacturing in Japan, and they are committed to 
improving their companies and the manufacturing 
sector in Japan. 
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What does it take to succeed as a U.S. company in the Japanese marketplace? Though differences in industries and 
products make every company’s experience unique, 
common themes and trends can be found. Those 
themes and trends come from conversations with 
various U.S. firms operating in Japan. First and most 
important, U.S. manufacturing companies must 
adapt to the Japanese way of manufacturing and 
producing. The Japanese market places a heavy 
emphasis on quality products, with attention to 
detail given top priority. Furthermore, Japanese 
producers who use inputs from American 
companies want a seamless transition from 
individual components to a finalized product. 
Adapting to the country’s heavy focus on a highly 
effective production process that creates quality 
specialty products is key for U.S. companies. 
Successful U.S. companies have also worked to 
strengthen their customer services—from working 
with customers, to designing specific products, to 
end-user assistance. 
Examples of U.S. Companies in Japan
Gleason Asia Co., Ltd.
The machine tool industry: Gleason is a wholly 
U.S.–owned gear-cutting tool manufacturer. 
Historically, American and European firms 
dominated the metal-cutting machine tools 
industry. However, the U.S. tool industry has been 
in decline for many years and has been trying 
to reduce costs. In the United States, there is no 
demand for maintaining a viable manufacturing 
base; as a result, companies are sourcing parts 
from outside the United States.
 In Japan, there is a large array of good 
manufacturing companies that are potential 
customers. This potential, coupled with the 
fact that Japanese tool machine suppliers 
have reduced costs and improve training, has 
enabled the suppliers to remain competitive. 
Japanese machine tool companies are even 
manufacturing products in the United States to 
supply the American domestic market. In Japan, 
the machine tool market is about 1.4 trillion yen 
(US$11.9 billion) of which 60 percent is supplied 
domestically, while 40 percent is supplied from 
imports. Of the demand for machine tools in 
Japan, 60 percent comes from the auto sector.37 In 
Japan, as in the United States, the machine tool 
industry is made up of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
What is the secret to Gleason’s success in 
Japan? According to representatives of Gleason, 
Japanese customers want their supply chains to 
be seamless and will accept nothing less than 
top- quality products and excellent customer 
support. Producing high-quality products that meet 
customers’ needs has been a key focus of Gleason. 
Customers also expect their suppliers to solve 
any problems quickly and, above all, to focus on 
Japanese customer needs. Meeting demands from 
customers has enabled Gleason to develop strong 
relations and presence in the industry. 
Customer interaction and support, including 
excellent technical knowledge, is key. As a 
result, Gleason has 60 employees working in 
sales and customer service in Japan. Gleason 
officials in Japan believe that a company’s U.S. 
headquarters needs to understand the Japanese 
culture. This understanding is especially true for 
Gleason, because there is no manufacturing of 
their products in Japan. By focusing on technical 
knowledge and advantage, gear design, and 
U.S. Companies That 
Succeed in Japan
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embedded software, plus given the difficulty of 
transferring this knowledge, Gleason has stayed 
competitive with its production in the United 
States despite the shrinking U.S. machine tool 
industry. 
Comparisons between U.S. and Japanese 
companies: Gleason representatives believe that 
Japanese companies are more flexible in meeting 
the standards of their customers. To do so, they 
focus on attention to detail in the production 
process, follow up with maintenance, and are 
willing to reduce profits to satisfy customers. 
Harley-Davidson, Japan
What is the secret to Harley-Davidson’s 
success? The motorcycle industry in Japan is 
very competitive, but Harley-Davidson’s success 
has been based on selling the product. Harley-
Davidson employees questioned about the 
company’s success believe that for American 
products to sell in the Japanese market, 
the manufacturer needs to have customer 
satisfaction, top-quality details, marketing 
excellence, and the concept of localization (or 
fitting in with the local market). 
In Japan, companies need to focus beyond just 
manufacturing a product. For the motorcycle 
industry, the after-sales service and strong sales 
and dealership channels are essential. With high 
costs for a single unit, excellent customer service 
at all ends of the spectrum is essential. In Japan, 
customer satisfaction comes from focusing on the 
smallest of details. Additionally, for customers 
who are the end users, treating the sales channel 
as a family is essential. Harley-Davidson’s 
marketing strategy is developed chiefly by its 
Japanese office so the company can focus on the 
unique elements of the Japanese market. 
According to the Harley-Davidson Japan 
representatives, the company focuses on 
selling the American spirit and its love for big 
motorcycles. It carries out a big event every 
year to bring the “Harley-Davidson culture” to 
Japan. The marketing campaign combines the 
Japanese mind with the American spirit, as well 
as Japanese culture with American country and 
western music. In most cases, the American brand 
is very appealing to the Japanese, but it also must 
be tailored. Harley-Davidson believes that, at 
times, many companies are simply pushing the 
globalization policy without fully understanding 
the localization angle. 
Boeing, Inc., Japan
Japanese aerospace industry: Boeing has had 
a long-standing, cooperative relationship with 
Japan. Boeing Commercial Airplanes has worked 
closely with the Japanese aerospace industry 
since 1969. Other segments of Boeing have been 
working with Japanese firms for more than 50 
years. Boeing has played a strong supportive role 
in developing the Japanese space industry since 
1970. Boeing is a leading provider of commercial 
jetliners to Japanese airlines, a major supplier of 
military equipment and aircraft to the Japanese 
Defense Agency, and a significant customer 
of—and partner with—the Japanese aerospace 
industry. 
Japan has been the largest single-country 
international market for Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes in dollar value since the very beginning 
of the jet era. Japan’s aerospace industry is small 
with total annual sales of only US$9 billion to 
US$10 billion, with the industry importing more 
than it exports. Yet aerospace is considered 
extremely important and strategic to the Japanese 
economy. Because Japan has stringent export 
control laws, it depends on working with foreign 
companies and suppliers. Japan’s aerospace 
sector is a major supplier of components and 
subsystems to foreign original equipment 
manufacturers, such as Boeing, Airbus, 
Bombardier, Embraer, General Electric, and 
Rolls-Royce.
Boeing’s partnerships in production: Japan 
is the second-largest source of commercial 
aircraft components for Boeing. Approximately 
85 Japanese firms are working with Boeing in 
various aspects. The Japanese aerospace industry 
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has helped design and build the 737, 747, 767, 
777 (supplying 20 percent of the 777 airframe 
value), and now the 787 (supplying 35 percent of 
the airframe). Japanese companies are basically 
moving up the value chain, with Boeing’s 
Japanese partners now designing, marketing, 
sourcing, and taking on more risk-sharing in 
product development. 
According to Boeing officials in Japan, Boeing’s 
business model in the Japanese aerospace 
market is based on finding excellent technology 
suppliers to partner with for every component of 
an airplane. Boeing has adopted a “just in time” 
shipping model, which was borrowed from the 
Toyota Production System model. The shipping 
model and TPS model have enabled Boeing to 
assemble the 787 Dreamliner in only three days, 
compared to 20 days for the 777. 
On July 8, 2007, Boeing rolled out the first 787, 
which Boeing officials claim as a great example 
of strategic cooperation and partnership. The 
Dreamliner reflects the importance with which 
Boeing views the Japanese market and its 
technological capability. Japan has been willing 
to invest in new state-of-the-art plants and new 
autoclaves to facilitate the 787’s production, in 
spite of the fact that Japan has a relatively small 
domestic industry. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,38 Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries, and Fuji Heavy Industries have been 
working with Boeing for more than 30 years on 
the development of the 767 and the 787. Those 
companies supply fuselage panels, aerodynamic 
fairings, landing-gear doors, and inspar ribs. 
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Various Japanese academics, government officials, industry officials, and U.S. companies operating in Japan 
have highlighted opportunities for greater 
U.S.–Japan cooperation in government and 
business endeavors. Twelve challenges and 
opportunities are listed next as illustrative 
samples of potential opportunities seen by Japan 
and multinationals operating in Japan. These 
examples do not represent endorsements of a 
company, an opportunity, or any specific policy 
recommendations. 
Academia
1. Challenge for Japan: There is a lack of 
engagement by U.S. researchers with Japan.
Opportunity for the United States: Forming 
early collaborations between U.S. and Japanese 
university professors, engineers, and researchers 
could provide opportunities for U.S.–developed 
technologies, products, and joint ventures. 
Professors collaborating to develop different 
applications with the same technologies can be 
vital to success. China is now sending researchers 
to Japanese research institutes because of visa 
restrictions for travel to the United States. Japanese 
collaborations and long-term alliances with China 
in the areas of nanotechnology, quantum physics, 
and information technology are being formed.39
Opportunity for the United States: The Centers of 
Excellence program, with its international focus, 
could be a launch pad for greater U.S.–Japan 
involvement and collaboration. Japan is seeking 
to make its research institutions world class. 
This move could provide an entry point for U.S. 
access.40
2. Challenge for Japan: Japan’s university 
curriculums do not meet the emerging needs of its 
industries.
Opportunity for the United States: Japan’s 
universities need to be reengaged with industry, 
so that curriculums are more closely linked to 
needed applied research and future technology 
development. Closing the gap between universities 
and industry on techniques to commercialize 
research and development (R&D) and technology 
transfer will be essential to fully harness the 
benefits of R&D. This area is where collaboration 
between the United States and Japan could be 
mutually beneficial. Universities also need to 
attract foreign researchers. This is an area where 
perhaps the United States can share best practices 
of effective programs and collaborative initiatives, 
and it will require participation of government and 
industry.41
Government
3. Challenge for Japan: Japan wants to be a leader 
in nanotechnology development.
Opportunity for the United States: Nanotechnology 
will be a linchpin for manufacturing 
competitiveness. Japan and the United States 
could collaborate closely on the nanotech front to 
develop standards conforming to the International 
Organization for Standarization. Infrastructure 
challenges and intellectual property protection are 
issues that should be considered.42
4. Challenge for Japan: Japan needs to increase 
venture capital and to reduce regulatory barriers in 
order to promote life sciences research.
Opportunities for Greater  
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Opportunity for the United States: Collaboration 
in the energy/environment/health areas could be 
helpful in the future in order to examine barriers 
to development. In Japan, there are few venture 
capital firms in the life sciences in comparison to 
the United States, because of the perceived high 
risk in investing in this sector. Japan is focusing on 
regulatory issues associated with life sciences, and 
it has set up a special commission to work with 
industry and universities. The United States could 
be involved in this initiative.43
5. Challenge for Japan: Japan has a shrinking 
population and workforce.
Opportunity for the United States: Immigration 
reform to open up Japan’s doors to foreign 
workers is being stressed by businesses across 
Japan. The declining population and aging 
workforce will be serious problems in the years 
ahead, and the change will require significant 
immigration reform to offset the effects. Emphasis 
on English as a common language in Japan 
could help to attract more overseas talent and 
collaboration, particularly with the United 
States.44
6. Challenge for Japan: Regulatory barriers in 
Japan impede market access and competition.
Opportunity for the United States: Harmonizing 
regulations and standards, obtaining greater 
clarity on Japanese labor policies, and protecting 
intellectual property rights are key areas of focus 
from the perspective of U.S.–based companies 
manufacturing in Japan.45
7. Challenge for Japan: There is a lackluster 
U.S.–Japan economic partnership.
Opportunity for the United States: A new bilateral 
initiative, similar to a free trade agreement but 
not focused on tariffs, is being called for by some. 
They see the focus of such an initiative as being 
on innovation, environment, energy, intellectual 
property rights, secure and seamless trade (port 
security), standards and regulations, rules for 
mergers and acquisitions, and foreign direct 
investment.46
Industry
8. Challenge for Japan: With an aging population, 
there is a need a for strong health-care sector in 
Japan.
Opportunity for the United States: There is 
significant consumer market demand in Japan 
in the health-care sector. Trained health-care 
professionals, services, and products will be 
needed. Health-care costs are also growing 
significantly, with individuals now having to 
cover a greater percentage just as Japan’s budget 
for medical services is shrinking. (Japan’s 
expenditures on health care are equal to 8 percent 
of gross domestic product, compared to 15 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
United States.)47 The upgrading by universities, 
research organizations, and medical institutions 
of their equipment could provide market 
opportunities for U.S. products and services.48
9. Challenge for Japan: Japan needs to meet the 
software needs of technology-driven companies.
Opportunity for the United States: U.S. software 
services could be pursued aggressively in the 
Japanese market. Most of Japan’s manufacturing 
base is using U.S. software to make their 
designs. Because none of the big companies 
are using Japanese software, few companies are 
developing software. Consequently, the Ministry 
of Education, Science, and Technology and the 
Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry 
are working on issues such as interoperability 
(including a US$1.1 billion investment), thereby 
creating infrastructure in industry, creating 
government simulations, and developing the next 
generation of supercomputers.49
10. Challenge for Japan: Japanese companies 
always need new and better suppliers in a 
globalized economy.
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Opportunity for the United States: There are 
opportunities for U.S. firms to get their products 
into Japan and into the Japanese production 
lines, but a certain business model has been 
suggested by U.S. firms currently operating in 
Japan. The model includes becoming “Japanese” 
as soon as possible; joining trade associations; 
hiring locals; seeking to be viewed as an “insider”; 
avoiding the “table-pounding” approach; being 
willing to “study and learn first, then teach”; and 
establishing strong relationships with the staff at 
the U.S. Embassy.50
11. Challenge for Japan: Japanese companies are 
looking to measure environmental impacts.
Opportunity for the United States: Environmental 
testing services will be a huge growth market—
particularly in measuring small particles. The 
United States is ahead in this arena and could 
continue to be a strong leader in the Japanese 
market.51
12. Challenge for Japan: Japanese companies 
face varying global standards and regulations on 
automobiles.
Opportunity for the United States: In the 
automotive sector, harmonizing fuel efficiency 
standards and regulations among the United 
States, the European Union, and Japan could 
ultimately help to improve U.S. competitiveness 
around the world.52 
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Japan’s blazing economic growth of the 1980s came to a halt with its stock market crash in 1990. A recession plagued the country for the 
next 10 years. Japan had fully recovered from the 
recession by 2004. In 2006, the economy grew by 
2.2 percent with domestic (particularly private) 
consumption, non-residential investment, and 
external demand contributing to the growth. 
Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006 was 
US$4.36 trillion. Exports are a major component of 
Japan’s GDP accounting for 15 percent of GDP in 
2006, with goods exports totaling US$647 billion.53 
The United States is Japan’s largest export market. 
Manufacturing has been a key element of Japan’s 
economy since the beginning of the post–World 
War II period. The manufacturing sector 
accounted for 21 percent of the nation’s GDP 
in 2004, an increase from its 2003 contribution 
level.54 Manufacturing exports from Japan equaled 
US$510.7 billion in 2006, which accounted for 
80 percent of the country’s total goods and 
services exports. Although the United States’ 
manufacturing exports, which equaled US$924 
billion, were larger than Japan’s in absolute value 
as a percentage of total exports, the manufacturing 
exports for the United States at almost 64 percent 
were much lower than Japan’s manufacturing 
exports as a percentage of total exports.55
Japan’s manufacturing sector also employs a 
significant portion of the country’s total labor 
force.56 Though declining slightly in recent years, 
the manufacturing sector in 2005 employed 
almost 17 percent of the country’s total work 
force.  According to an Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, 
Japan has the second-largest manufacturing sector 
behind the United States, but it is significantly 
above the number three country, China. In 2002, 
the Japanese manufacturing sector equaled 
around US$800 million. The United States 
manufacturing sector equaled around US$1,400 
million.57 In 2005, Japan had almost 470,000 
manufacturing enterprises.58 In 2002, the United 
States had more than 350,000 manufacturing 
enterprises.59 
Throughout 2005, the stock of U.S. foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Japan equaled US$75.5 billion, 
significantly up from only US$68.1 billion in 2004. 
The U.S. FDI in Japan is mostly in the finance 
sector, manufacturing, wholesale trade, and 
professional and technical services.60
Although total FDI in Japan had been growing, 
FDI by 2005 accounted for only 2.4 percent of 
GDP in comparison to the United States, where 
FDI accounted for 15 percent of GDP. FDI in the 
United States in 2005 equaled US$1.6 billion, of 
which 12 percent was from Japanese investors. 
Investment by Japan in 2004 accounted for almost 
1 percent of private-sector GDP and for 614,000 
workers in the United States.61 Japanese foreign-
owned industries in the United States are mostly in 
the transportation machines, chemicals, food and 
agricultural processing, machines, and electronic 
sectors.62
In Japan’s strong manufacturing sector, foreign-
affiliated companies have played a valued 
role. There were 463 foreign affiliates in the 
manufacturing sector in Japan, of which 175 were 
U.S. owned. This figure compared to a total of 468 
Japanese affiliates in the United States.63 In 2004, 
4,272 total foreign affiliates were in Japan, of which 
17.6 percent were in the manufacturing sector.64 
Manufacturing foreign affiliates accounted for 
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US$24.5 billion in exports in 2003,65 which was 
almost 5 percent of total goods exported from 
Japan that year.66 Foreign manufacturing affiliates 
in Japan employed almost 165,700 workers in 
2003.67
According to a survey of foreign affiliates in Japan, 
a majority of foreign affiliates surveyed saw the 
Japanese market favorably, and more than half 
of the survey companies planned to expand their 
operations in Japan.68 Japanese manufacturing 
firms have also gone overseas and have set up 
foreign affiliates, especially within the United 
States. Japanese foreign affiliate manufacturing 
plants are set up across the country, with the 
greatest number of Japanese manufacturing 
plants being in California, followed by Ohio, 
Illinois, and Georgia. The greatest number of 
Japanese foreign affiliates in the United States 
are found in the transportation machine parts 
industry, followed by chemical and oil products, 
food and agricultural processing, machinery, and 
electronic/electrical parts.69
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Comparing Economies: Japan and the United States
GDP (US$ billions)
Indicator
4,360 13,246
Japan United States
Total exports (goods and services; US$ billions) 647 1,037
Exports as a percentage of GDP 15      8
Manufacturing exports (US$ billions) 510.7 924
Manufacturing exports as a percentage of total exports 80 63
GDP per capita (US$) 34,188 44,190
Investment as a percentage of GDP 24.1 20
2.4 15FDI as a percentage of GDP (2005)
Table A.1: Key Economic Indicators of Japan and the United States, 2006
Source: Japan External Trade Organization, World Trade Organization, Economic Intelligence Unit, and the International Monetary Fund.
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Table A.2: Manufacturing Foreign Aliates in Japan and in the United States
Percent of Total 
Manufacturing Foreign 
Aliate Activity by 
U.S. Manufacturing 
Foreign Aliates,
2003
Percent of Total 
Manufacturing Foreign 
Aliate Activity by 
U.S. Manufacturing 
Foreign Aliates,
20022002 2003
Number of Enterprises
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
U.S. manufacturing aliates
419
168 175
463
37.840.1
Number of Employees
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
U.S. manufacturing aliates
123,127
65,060
165,693
31.438,663
21.2
0.55
39.3
Total Exports (billions of US$)
Value Added (billions of US$)
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
U.S. manufacturing aliates
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
U.S. manufacturing aliates
19.12 24.55
5.213.17
4.09
16.6
16.19 20.88
4.58 41.728.38.71
R&D Expenditure (billions of US$)
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
U.S. manufacturing aliates
3.19
7.40.30 17.4
Manufacturing Foreign Aliates in Japan
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Manufacturing Foreign Aliates in the United States
Percent of Total 
Manufacturing Foreign 
Aliate Activity by 
Japan Manufacturing 
Foreign Aliates,
2003
Percent of Total 
Manufacturing Foreign 
Aliate Activity by 
Japan Manufacturing 
Foreign Aliates, 
20022002 2003
Number of Enterprises
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
Japan manufacturing aliates *
1,768
491 468
1,703
27.028.0
Number of Employees
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
Japan manufacturing aliates
2,236,400
310,600
2,117,400
14.6326,400
16.4
1.2
14.7
Total Exports (billions of US$)
Value Added (billions of US$)
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
Japan manufacturing aliates
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
Japan manufacturing aliates
88.5 87.8
14.412.7
21.0
14.4
229.2 220.6
28.9 13.212.629.1
R&D Expenditure (billions of US$)
Total manufacturing foreign aliates
Japan manufacturing aliates
20.1
5.31.1 6.0
Source: OECD, Measuring Globalisation: Activities of Multinationals, Manufacturing, (Paris: OECD, 2007). www.oecd.org/document/37/0,3343,en_2649_33703_38763813_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
Figures for investment in Japan originally were in Japanese yen. Conversions are based on an exchange rate of 126.36 yen per US$1 in 2002 and 118.33 yen per US$1 in 2003.
*Data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce
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R&D spending in Japan and the United States
Indicator
3.30
Japan United States
Table C.1: Comparison of R&D Expenditures between Japan and the United States
Year
2005
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP 2.60
Total GDP expenditure (US$)* 2005 287.8 billion 115.1 billion
R&D expenditure by source of nancing, 
percentage share in national total 2006/2005
       Government 29.30 16.80
       Business Enterprise 64.90 76.10
   Other national sources and foreign sources 5.80 7.10
Business enterprise sector R&D expenditure
as a percentage of value added in industry 2005 2.60 3.40
2003 196.1 billion 85.5 billion
2003 4.00 0.80
Government R&D expenditures as 
percentage of GDP 2005/2003
 Civil 0.50 0.70
0.000.63 Defense
*Figures are adjusted to purchasing power parity for the U.S. dollar in 2000.
 Share of government-nanced business R&D
 Business R&D espenditure (US$)
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indication Database, May 2007; OECD, R&D database, May 2005.
Comparison of R&D Expenditures 
between Japan and the United States
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ASEAN Association for Southeast Asian Nations
ATIP Asian Technology Information Program
ATP Advanced Technology Program 
CNC computer numerical control
COE Center of Excellence 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
FDI foreign direct investment
GDP  gross domestic product
ICYS International Center for Young Scientists
JMTBA Japan Machine Tool Builders Association
METI Ministry of Economics, Trade, and   
 Industry 
MEXT  Ministry of Education, Science, and   
 Technology
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NEDO New Energy and Industrial Technology  
 Development Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation  
 and Development
R&D  research and development
S&T  science and technology 
SME small and medium-sized enterprise 
TLO Technology Licensing Organization
TPS Toyota Production System
USJBC U.S.–Japan Business Council
WPI World Premier International Research  
 Centers Initiative
WTO World Trade Organization
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1 Many economists agree that 2004 brought an end to the 
recession that started in 1990. See Appendix A, “Overview 
of Japan’s Economy and Manufacturing Sector,” for a 
summary of Japan’s economy and manufacturing trends.
2 Japan’s blazing economic growth of the 1980s came to 
a halt with the stock market’s crash in 1990. A recession 
plagued the country for the next 10 years. Japan fully 
recovered from the recession in 2004. See Appendix A 
for an overview of Japan’s economy and manufacturing 
sector. 
3 Japan’s population growth has slowed in recent years, 
declining sharply since the 1980s. According to the 2005 
Census Report, the population was 127.76 million, below 
the 2004 estimate of 127.78 million. This decline marked 
the first time since World War II that population had 
fallen from the previous year. It is expected to shrink at a 
pace unprecedented for any nation in peacetime. In 2005, 
the population of elderly citizens (65 and over) was 26.82 
million, constituting 21 percent of the total population 
and marking record highs. (This figure compares to 7.1 
percent of the population in 1970.) The percentage of the 
aging population in Japan is rising much faster than in 
advanced Western European countries or in the United 
States. By 2015, the population of elderly will have risen 
to one in four, or more than 30 million. Statistics Bureau 
and Statistical Research and Training Institute, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2005, “Briefing: 
Japan’s Changing Demography,” The Economist, July 
28–August 3.
4 Innovation 25 Strategy Council, “Innovation 25 
Interim Report,” February 26, 2007, p. 1. www.cao.go.jp/
innovation/en/pdf/innovation25_interim_full.pdf; 
final report released May 25, 2007, and approved by the 
Japanese government cabinet on June 1, 2007.
5 Ibid. 
6 The Nikkei, “Japan’s Productivity Only 70% of U.S. in ’05: 
Cabinet Office,” Wednesday, April 11, 2007, morning ed.
7 Ibid.
8 Innovation 25 Strategy Council, “Innovation 25 Interim 
Report.” 
9 Tokyo Regional Office, National Science Foundation, 
“Report Memorandum #07-04,” May 11, 2007. www.
nsftokyo.org/rm0,-04.pdf. 
10 Ibid. 
11 MEXT Government Budget Seminar for Academic 
Scientific Research, January 2007. 
12 See Appendix C; OEDC, R&D database, May 2005; 
OECD Main Science, Technology, and Industry database.
13Ibid.
14 Government of Japan, “Science & Technology Basic 
Plan,” March 28, 2006. www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/
basic/3rd-Basic-Plan-rev.pdf.
15 MEXT Government Budget Seminar, 2007.
16 METI Technology Policy in Japan, February 2007.
17 METI White Paper on Manufacturing Competitiveness, 
2006.
18 Ibid. 
19 Government of Japan, “Long-term Strategic Guidance 
Innovation 25,” June 1, 2007. www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
innovation/innovation_final.pdf. 
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20 National Institute for Materials Science, International 
Center for Young Scientists. www.nims.go.jp/
icys/01about/0101.html. 
21 New Energy and Industrial Technology Development 
Organization (NEDO), 2006, “Profile of NEDO,” Saiwai, 
Japan. 
22 Genba means “on-the-spot,” “at the scene,” or “being 
present on the shop floor.” It is what managers are 
expected to do in manufacturing plants. This concept is 
embodied in manufacturing excellence.
23 Interview with Varian Technologies, Tokyo, Japan.
24 Interview with FANUC, Mt. Fuji, Japan. 
25 Integrated processes are used for the production 
of items that require many components to be 
carefully designed to work together to ensure optimal 
performance. The design of those interrelated items 
requires teamwork among the research, development, 
and production components of a company, as well as 
between producers and their suppliers. 
26 Based on interviews conducted in Japan; see Appendix 
B for list of interviews. 
27 International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database, 2006. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx.
28 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2007 
estimate. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html.
29 Japan has signed bilateral free trade agreements 
with Singapore, Chile, the Association for Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Mexico and has agreed 
in principle with Australia, Switzerland, and the Gulf 
countries. Japan also participates in the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum and various other 
regional trade groups, such as the Asia-Europe meeting, 
ASEAN+ 3, and an East Asian summit. World Trade 
Organization, “Trade Policy Review: Japan. 2007.” www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).” www.
mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/index.html 
30 The USJBC called for a comprehensive economic 
partnership agreement that would significantly cover 
trade in industrial and agricultural goods, trade in 
services, non-tariff barriers such as standards and 
regulations, investment rules, and trade compliance 
issues. “Revitalizing U.S.–Japan Economic Relations: 
2007 Policy Statement.” www.usjbc.org/2007%20
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